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THIS ALJ SAID TOO MUCH: PRISON HEARING
OFFICER CHARGES MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS WITH FIRST AMENDMENT
VIOLATIONS AND RACE DISCRIMINATION
By Carolyn Amadon'
I. INTRODUCTION
The ability to conduct hearings as a fair and independent fact
finder is one of the most important elements of the position of
Administrative Law Judge. When independence is threatened by the
possibility of unemployment or other retaliation, the ALJ can not
perform his job properly. Hearing officers at the Michigan Department
of Corrections (MDOC) were expected to find prisoner's guilty at a
90% rate when involved in conflicts with prison correction officers. As
the first African-American hearing officer hired by the MDOC in 1988,
Mr. Everett Perry was expected to meet this obligation. Although his
first two years of employment passed without controversy, as Mr. Perry
heard more cases he no longer met the MDOC requirement of a 90%
prisoner conviction rate; his conviction rate slipped to 83% prisoner
convictions. The friction between the MDOC and Mr. Perry increased
from 1990 to 1995. The MDOC carefully created a paper trail of
counseling memoranda, citing Mr. Perry for, among other things,
believing the word of prisoners over correction officers in some cases.
Mr. Perry continued to rule according to his conscience and exercise
free and independent fact finding when he presided over prisoner
hearings. His employment was terminated in November 1995.
On September 11, 1996, the U.S. District Court of the Eastern
District of Michigan granted and denied in part a motion to dismiss the
plaintiffs First Amendment and equal protection race discrimination
claims, where plaintiff, Everett Perry, claimed that he was disciplined
and terminated by the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)2
Third-year law student, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
2 The named defendants are Kenneth McGinnis, Director of MDOC, Marjorie
Van Ochten, Administrator of the Office for Policy and Hearings for the Michigan
Department of Correction; Leonard Den Houter, Hearing Officer/Supervisor, and Richard
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for exercising free speech concerning his (1) written decisions and
findings as an Administrative Law Examiner (ALE) in prisoner
misconduct hearings, and (2) his assertions of race discrimination. 3
In denying the First Amendment complaint, Judge Duggan
stated that:
The Court recognizes that plaintiff's findings at
issue in this case may have been supported and
appropriate in light of the evidence; however, the
correctness of his decisions do not, in this Court's
opinion, automatically entitle his decisions to First
Amendment protection. In this unique context, this
Court believes that plaintiff's First Amendment right to
speak on matters of public concern (arguably prison
misconduct hearing results) is outweighed by the
MDOC's interest in disciplining its ALEs through the
monitoring of their job performances via their hearing
reports.4
The Judge considered the following in denying Mr. Perry's race
discrimination claim:
In this case, plaintiffs complaints and
grievances of race discrimination were limited to
internal administrative proceedings and
meetings...Plaintiff s statement....that speech involving
discrimination is 'inherently' a matter of public concern
are insufficient to withstand ... Sixth Circuit case law."5
The court denied Plaintiff s motion for rehearing on his second
amended complaint on March 14, 1997, stating that there was no
palpable defect in the prior ruling that would require a different
Stapleton, Manager of the Hearings and Appeals Division of the Office of Policy and
Hearings, in their official and individual capacities.
3 Perry v. McGinnis, et al., no. 96-CV-71373 D.T., slip op. at 2 (E.D. Michigan
Sept. 11, 1996).
4 Id. at 5.
' Id. at 8, 9. At this point, plaintiff's First and Fifth Amendment claims dropped
out, as well as his procedural due process claim. Plaintiff's equal protection and Elliott-
Larsen Civil Rights Act claims were not dismissed. See also Perry v. McGinnis, et al., 2 F.
Supp. 2d 952, 953 (U.S. D. Ct., S. Div.)(1998).
holding.' The MDOC's subsequent motion for summary judgment,
regarding Everett Perry's equal protection and Elliott-Larsen Civil
Rights Act race discrimination claims, was granted by the court on
April 15, 1998. 7 The holding specified that, "plaintiff was not qualified
for his job because he did not meet his employer's expectations .... [his]
objection go to the defendants' judgment regarding the way hearing
officers should perform their jobs. This is not sufficient to prove a
prima facie case of discrimination."8 The court also found that plaintiff
was not treated differently from white hearing officers who were
similarly situated, because the plaintiff allegedly made errors that were,
"repetitive and led to more complaints from institutional staff," and
were of a more "fundamental nature," than the errors made by the white
hearing officers.9
Plaintiff Everett Perry appeals the grant of summary judgment,
in an action which will soon come before the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
II. BACKGROUND
Hired in October 1988, Everett Perry was the first prison
hearing officer of African-American descent to survive the probationary
hiring period at the MDOC.'0 His three-month and six-month
evaluations were both satisfactory; he continued to receive satisfactory
ratings during his first two years of employment at the MDOC. 1
Beginning in 1990, Mr. Perry started receiving "counseling
memoranda," issued by his supervisor after many of the prison staff
6 See MAALJ Amicus Brief for Everett Perry at 3, ref no. 1996-03134 (Perry v.
Department of corrections, Employment Relations Board). Plaintiff filed First Amendment
free speech, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims, Fourteenth
Amendment and state law (Elliott-Larsen) equal protection claims. Again, the court
dismissed all but the Fourteenth and Elliott-Larsen equal protection and discrimination
claims. See also Perry, 2 F. Supp 2d at 953.
See MAALJ Amicus Brief at 4.
s Perry, 2 F. Supp. 2d 952 at 956.
9 Perry, at 957.
10 See Plaintiff-Appellant's Proof Brief at 5 (Perry v. McGinnis, et al., (no. 98-
11607) U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit).
" See id.
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who were ruled against in Mr. Perry's hearings complained to the
MDOC's hearing division."2 This resulted in a heightened scrutiny of
Mr. Perry's work by his supervisor, Mr. Den Houter, under the direct
instructions of the head of the hearings division, Ms. Van Ochten. 3
The "counseling memoranda," issued during the period from March
1990 to November 1993, analyzed Mr. Perry's opinions, citing
deficiencies in his credibility findings for prisoners instead of prison
staff and his lack of rational analysis and evidentiary bases for his
decisions. "
One of the many examples of this criticism against Mr. Perry
occurred in a situation where a prisoner had been disciplined, (given a
ticket), for warning another prisoner that a guard was just pretending to
leave in order to catch the other prisoner telling a joke about the
guard. 5 At the hearing, Mr. Perry found that the "burden necessary for
a finding of guilt on this charge is not sustained. I find the credibility
of the inmate to be of the highest nature. I find from previous tickets
officer Mitchell's credibility to be questionable and the facts as noted
in the ticket to be unbelievable to me."' 6 The resulting counseling
memorandum prepared by Mr. Perry's supervisor states, "I believe you
should re-evaluate your basic assumptions regarding credibility.. .It
seems to me that you assume staff are fabricating reports until you have
evidence that exonerates them .... Your decision, as you know, must be
based on evidence and not upon your assumptions about the
motivations of particular individuals."' 7
The MDOC admits that it is a duty of the hearing officer to
determine a prisoner's credibility or the weight of the evidence.' 8 In
2 See State Bar of Michigan, Administrative Law Section, Amicus Curiae Brief
in support of Everett Perry, at 1 (case no. 97-87308-AA).
13 See id. at 2.
'4 See id. at 4.
'5 See MAALJ Amicus Brief at 6, citing Exhibit G 15, the case of Mr. Brigham.
16 See id. citing Exhibit G 15. Mr. Brigham's testimony in this case was
collaborated by several other testimony from fellow inmates. See id.
"7 See id. at 7. The comment provided by the MAALJ (Michigan Association of
Administrative Law Judges), remarks that, "all testimony, even from guards, should be
evaluated with skepticism, as Mr. Perry as done in this case. DOC's hypersensitivity on
this issue reveals more about DOC's interest as a litigant than Mr. Perry's competence as a
judge." See id. at 8.
"8 See id. at 6.
prisoner misconduct hearings in Michigan, an ALE acts as fact-finder
and judge for cases brought by the prison staff against the inmates for
"major misconduct tickets."' 9 Mr. Perry is required to be a fair,
independent fact-finder;20 the burden in a major misconduct hearing is
on the prison, which must prove the prisoner's conduct by a
preponderance of the evidence.2 In the case of Mr. Perry, the MDOC
questioned his "high" rate of acquitting prisoners, where the approved
average of prisoner "not guilty" findings is 10%.22 Mr. Perry turned in
an average rate of 17 or 18% "not guilty" findings, for which he was
subject to conferences by his supervisor, Mr. Den Houter, including
regular notification of his monthly or quarterly "not guilty" rates.23 In
creating the paper trail necessary to terminate Mr. Perry, only a fraction
of one percent of his estimated 12,000 to 24,000 hearing decisions were
reviewed.24 Many of the faults for which the plaintiff was disciplined
were petty, including having typographical errors or using the wrong
terms in his reports.25 Some of the white hearing officers at the MDOC
committed similar petty errors, but they did not receive any form of
written discipline for their mistakes.26
The MDOC put Mr. Perry on interim conditional service rating
(probation) in February 1993. The only other hearing officer to receive
such a rating during this time period was an ALE who did not
accurately report his time worked, was consistently late for work, and
'9 See id. at 4.
20 See Michigan Rule of Professional Conduct (MMRPC) 6.5.
21 See MAALJ Amicus Brief at 5.
22 See id.
23 See id.
14 See id. at 8, 9. Hearing officers were expected to conduct 20 hearings a day.
In the case of Mr. Perry, he probably had from 2,400 to 4,800 hearings per year over a five
year period. See id., p. 8. Out of all these hearings, only 121 were reheard due to complaints
from prison staff. See id., p. 13. Mr. Perry's supervisor, Ms. Van Ochten, did not conduct
any sort of independent investigation of Mr. Perry's record and relied solely on Mr. Den
Houter's and Mr. Stapleton's recommendation in their decision to fire Mr. Perry. See id. at
12.
1 See id. at 9, 10. For example, plaintiff was disciplined for "failing to state why
a razor blade is dangerous;" for, "failing to type the entire name of a charge at the top of his
report;" for, "using the term, 'official notice;' and for, "failing to state why an inmate was
not guilty of a lesser included offense, when the inmate was found guilty of a major
misconduct." See id. at 10.
26 See id. at 11. Citing dispositions of other hearing officers: Craig, Bullock,
Baerwalde.
Snrine 1999 First Amendment Violations
XIX Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 114
took long lunch breaks." Perry then sent a letter to Michigan Governor
John Engler on March 16, 1993, complaining of the pressure to find
prisoners guilty, the race discrimination and the retaliation by his
supervisors because he told them that the pressure to find inmates guilty
was illegal.28 Plaintiff was terminated on November 5, 1995; he was
replaced with a white hearing officer who had previously been laid
off.29 The grievance filed by Mr. Perry with the Civil Service
Commission, (CSC), before his termination, complaining of the
MDOC's threats of discipline for his pro-prisoner rulings, was heard
and denied on June 21, 1994.30 The Employment Relations Board,
(ERB), reviewed this decision and reinstated Mr. Perry, stating that the
number of decisions upon which plaintiffs termination was based was
small in comparison to his total output and that some of the criticisms
were trivial in nature.3 When the CSC reviewed the ERB decision, it
remanded to the previous CSC officer and instructed her to ignore the
issue of pro-prisoner bias. The CSC officer affirmed plaintiff's
discharge, stating this time that Mr. Perry, "places fairness foremost,"
did not articulate reasons, use rational analysis, or have evidentiary
bases for his credibility decisions.32
Plaintiff Everett Perry appeals the district court's grant of
summary judgment to the Defendant MDOC (April 15, 1998), claiming
that summary judgment was improper; that he was denied his First
Amendment right of free speech; that the MDOC retaliated against him
for the exercise of these rights and for his assertions of their practice of
race discrimination.
III. DISCUSSION
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
27 See id.
28 See id. at 11. Copies of the letter were sent to J. Jackson, MDOC director
McGinnis. See id.
29 See id. at 12. Mr. Perry was the only hearing officer ever terminated. See id.
30 See State Bar of Michigan Brief at 5. The CSC statement reads, in part, "The
department has demonstrated...that the grievant was not truly impartial, as required by state
statute and departmental rules. His discharge was for just cause." See id.
31 See id. at 5, 6.
32 See id. at 5.
Michigan erred on April 15, 1998 when it dismissed Plaintiff's equal
protection and state Elliott-Larsen claim. It also erred previously on
September 11, 1996 in dismissing Plaintiff's First Amendment and
substantive due process claims. In both holdings, the court did not fully
consider that plaintiff's claims presented genuine issues of material fact
according to the appropriate standard for granting summary judgment 3.
The court did not view the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, nor did it accept the facts as alleged by the plaintiff as true.34
A. PLAINTIFF'S EQUAL PROTECTION AND ELLIOT-
LARSEN CLAIMS
In granting summary judgment for the MDOC regarding the
plaintiff's equal protection claims, the U.S. District Court found that a
prima facie case of discrimination based on race was not established.35
The court relied on the test articulated in Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock
Chemicals Co., which states that (1) the plaintiff must be a member of
the protected class, (2) must suffer adverse employment action, (3)
must be qualified for the position, and (4) be replaced by a person not
of the protected class. 36 While the first two elements are sufficiently
determined by the facts of the case, the court found that elements three
and four were not met in this case.37
Regarding the third element, the plaintiff's qualification for the
job, the court emphasized the poor performance ratings given to the Mr.
Perry, which stating that, "plaintiff cannot raise a genuine issue of fact
regarding the quality of his work by merely challenging the judgment
of his superiors. ' The court relied on the provision in Ang v. Procter
& Gamble, that "a plaintiff is not considered to be qualified for his
position if he fails to meet his employer's expectations. ' 39 As discussed
3 See Fed. Rule Civ. P. 12 (b)(6).
3 See Plaintiff's Proof Brief at 14, citing Sistruck v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d
194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996).
" See Perry, at 955.
36 See Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. 29 F. 3d 1078, 1081 (6th
Cir. 1994). See also Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital 964 F 2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992).
" See Perry, at 956.
3' Perry, at 956.
9 Ang v. Procter & Gamble Co., 932 F.2d 540, 548 (6th Cir. 1991).
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in the Plaintiff-Appellant's Proof Brief, the court did not address the
further provision in Ang which requires that the expectations of the
employer must be legitimate.40 By relying on the allegations of the
defense alone regarding the quality of Mr. Perry's findings and his
frequency of 'not guilty' findings, the court did not properly consider
the allegations of the plaintiff that employer's expectations were not
legitimate. Among other complaints, the plaintiff specifically
challenged MDOC's expectation that he find 90% of the prisoners
guilty in the prison hearing process, expectations that were clearly not
legitimate in light of statutory mandate to provide due process in
prisoner hearings.4
Although the plaintiff's position was subsequently filled by a
person in a non-protected class, thus fulfilling on its face the fourth
element of the Manzer test, the court followed the analysis that the
fourth element of the test could also be met by the plaintiffs showing
that a, "non-protected person was treated better," and that, "for the same
or similar conduct he was treated differently than similarly-situated
non-minority employees. '2 In the case at hand, many of the plaintiffs
fellow hearing officers who were white also committed the same types
of petty errors as those for which the plaintiff was disciplined. These
officers were not, however, subject to the same disciplinary memoranda
and scrutiny that the plaintiff experienced. In spite of this, the court
found that the white hearing officers were not similarly situated to the
plaintiff, because plaintiff was fired, "based on his inadequacies in
analyzing facts, assessing the credibility of witnesses, understanding the
definitions of different forms of misconduct and making an adequate
record of his cases."43 The court also found that the errors committed
by the white hearing officers were of a, "less fundamental nature," than
the errors committed by the plaintiff.44
Contrary to the court's finding that the white hearing officers at
the MDOC were not similarly situated, plaintiff, using the test in the
40 See id at 548. See also Plaintiff's Proof Brief at 38.
41 See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963 (1974), where the
Supreme Court requiring due process hearings for prisoners before they could be subject to
discipline for prison misconduct. See id.
41 See Mitchell, supra note 36, at 582.
41 Perry, at 957.
44 See id.
Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. case, argues that his
colleagues, "(1) dealt with the same supervisor, (2) were subjected to
the same standards, and (3) engaged in similar conduct without such
differentiating or mitigating circumstances that would distinguish his
conduct or Defendants' treatment of him for it."45 While there is no
question that all the hearing officers had the same supervisor and were
subject to the same standards, the court argues that the, "less
fundamental nature" of the white hearing officers' errors as compared
to the plaintiff's errors, and their, "repetitive nature," constituted
"differentiating or mitigating circumstances" which would prevent the
white officers from being similarly situated to the African-American
plaintiff.46 Again, the court has not viewed the facts as alleged in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. The court comes close to an
impermissible factual finding in this case and does not apply a proper
standard for summary judgment.
B. FIRST AMENDMENT AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS CLAIMS
Plaintiff argues that his first amendment and substantive due
process claims, which were dismissed on September 11, 1996, should
be heard de novo: "the issue... is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately
prevail but whether the plaintiff is entitled to offer evidence to support
claims."'47 Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits de
novo review of grants of summary judgment.4"
1. First Amendment Free Speech Claims
Plaintiff Everett Perry filed a properly pled complaint, in
compliance with Section 1983 of the United States Code and applicable
case law, which requires the plaintiff to state, (1) he was deprived of a
right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States; and
(2) the deprivation was caused by a person who was acting under the
See Plaintiff's Proof Brief at 41, citing Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 1998 WL 546534*5 (6th Cir. August 31, 1998).
46 See Perry at 957.
4' See Plaintiffs Proof Brief at 14, citing Schueuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,
236, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 1686 (1974).
41 See Fed. Rule Civ. P. 56. See also Plaintiff's Proof Brief at 33, citing Gantt v.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1045 (6th Cir. 1998).
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color of state law.49 Plaintiff, as a public employee acting in his official
capacity, was acting under the color of state law, thus fulfilling the
second element of the test.50 The first element is met in the facts as
alleged by the plaintiff in reference to his First Amendment rights and
race discrimination claims; a government employee who is retaliated
against for exercising his First Amendment rights of free speech has
suffered a violation of a right secured by the Constitution.5
For speech to be protected under the First Amendment, the
Supreme Court required in Connick v. Meyers that it must first be
speech on a matter of public concern.52 The court conceded that the
plaintiff's speech regarding the operation of prison hearings was a
matter of public concern in its September 11, 1996 ruling.53 The
plaintiff pled in his complaint that the MDOC retaliated against him for
his complaints of race discrimination and for his criticism and refusal
to abide by the MDOC's mandate of having a high percentage of
'guilty' findings in prison hearings. In fact, the plaintiff strived for fair-
fact finding and independent decision making as mandated in Wolffand
the Michigan legislature. " These allegations against a public
employer, "who tried to curtail fairness and independence in the way its
hearing officer dealt with inmates," is clearly a matter of public
concern.
55
After the court finds that the speech is a matter of public
concern, a balancing test described by the Supreme Court in Pickering
v Board of Education is applied, which requires a balance between the
" See Plaintiffs Proof Brief 16, citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2254-55 (a public Employee is usually acting under the color
of state law where serving in his official capacity) See id. See also Bird v. Summit County,
730 F.2d 442,444 (6th Cir. 1984).
1o See Plaintiffs Proof Brief at 17, citing West, supra note 49 at 2255.
"' See Plaintiff s Proof Brief at 17, citing Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 142,
103 S.Ct. 1684, 1687 (1987), a government employee cannot, "condition public
employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in
freedom of expression." See id.
52 See Plaintiff's Proof Brief at 17, citing Connick v. Meyers at 1688.
3 See Perry (1996) at 9.
4 See State Bar of Michigan Amicus Brief at 20, citing Wolff, 418 U.S. 539, 94
S. Ct., 2966 and MRPC 6.5.
11 See Plaintiffs Proof Brief at 24, citing Parate v. Isibor, 868 F2d 821, 828-830
(6th Cir. 1989), "public interest is near its zenith when ensuring that public organizations
are being operated in accordance with the law." See id.
interest of an employee as a "citizen commenting upon matters of
public concern," and government's interest in, "promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees."56
In this case the interest of Everett Perry in ensuring equitable prison
hearings must be balanced with the government's interest in
disciplining prison hearing officers.
In this case, the interest put forth by the MDOC is that it, "has
to be able to discipline its hearing officers for determinations made in
prison misconduct hearing reports; otherwise all ALEs would be
insulated from accountability for any statements made in that
context."57 Here again, the court did not view the facts as alleged in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. The plaintiffs complaint does not
allege or imply that, "by allowing Mr. Perry to make determinations
based on the law and the facts that 'all ALEs would be insulated from
accountability [regarding their hearing determinations]."'5 8 Yet, the
court assumes that the outcome desired by Mr. Perry's complaint would
result in just such an insulation of all ALEs from accountability. In this
case, however, the court did not follow the additional requirement in
Meyers v. City of Cincinnati that the interest of the government must be
legitimate in order for the Pickering balancing test to tip in its favor.59
Hindering the plaintiffs compliance with the mandates of Wo/ff which
require fair prison hearings, does not constitute a legitimate interest on
the part of the government. The plaintiff s free speech interest should
outweigh the government's interest in disciplining its hearing officers,
in the case at hand.
The third test which must be met in deciding if Mr. Perry's
speech was protected under the First Amendment is presented in Mt.
Healthy School District v. Doyle, that the speech was a substantial or
motivating factor in the denial of the benefit that was sought.6" In this
case, the plaintiffs head supervisor responsible for the ultimate firing
decision, Ms. Van Ochten, stated in deposition, "certainly the
36 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 565, 568, 88 S. Ct. 1731, 1734-35
(1968).
51 See Perry (1996) at 5 (emphasis in the original).
51 See id. See also Plaintiff's Proof Brief at 2 6.
9 See Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 934 F.2d 726, 730 (6th Cir. 1991)
'o See Mt. Healthy School District v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-287, 97 S Ct.
568 (1977)
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complaints of the wardens and deputies would have been one of the
factors, if not the most important factor, in precipitating this request
(for the review of Mr. Perry's work)."6' Thus, plaintiff's speech in the
form of his prison hearing rulings was a motivating factor in his
dismissal and should thus be classified as speech protected by the First
Amendment.
The Mt. Healthy test also requires a finding that absent the
protected conduct, the act of government dismissal of the employee
would have occurred in any case." Given the fact that plaintiffs
protected speech was arguably a motivating factor in his dismissal, and
that plaintiffs disciplinary memoranda were based on his exercise of
protected speech; it is not for the court to decide the issue of fact of
whether the plaintiffs dismissal would have occurred in any case.
Thus, in applying the Connick, Pickering and Mt. Healthy tests,
the plaintiff's speech should have been held protectable under the First
Amendment; the court erred in granting a motion for summary
judgment in the face of plaintiffs protected constitutional rights.
2. Race Discrimination Claim
Plaintiff s race discrimination claims were improperly dismissed
by the lower court on September 11, 1996; the court misapplied Federal
and Sixth Circuit case law. The court focused on the fact that plaintiff
followed the MDOC internal grievance procedure and, therefore, his
allegation of, "racially disparate treatment [did] not constitute a matter
of pubic concern. 63  Although the Supreme court ruled in Connick
that, "racial discrimination is a matter inherently of public concern.,"'
the lower court cited a ruling in a Sixth Circuit case which held that the
plaintiffs personal discrimination charge was part of his own,
"personal employment dispute. 65 In the court's view, this indicated
61 See ACLU Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Everett Perry at 12 (case no. 98-
1607) (Perry v. McGinnis, et al.), citing the deposition of Ms. Van Ochten, Aug. 14, 1997,
at 125.
62 See Mt. Healthy, supra note 60, at 287.
63 See Perry (1996) at 6.
6 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149 n. 8, 103 S. C. at 1691 n. 8.
65 See Plaintiff's Proof Brief at 28, citing Rice v. Ohio Dept. of Transportation
887 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1989).
that Mr. Perry's complaint of racial discrimination was not inherently
a matter of public concern. The court ignored the guidance of the
Supreme Court in Connick, which distinguished "matters" of public
concern and "matters" of personal interest, and the guidance of the
Sixth Circuit in Chappel v. Montgomery County Fire Protection Dist.
No. 1, which provides that the question of motives of the plaintiff, "is
clearly illogical and contrary to the broader purposes of the First
Amendment."' Thus, the lower court did not properly apply governing
case law in granting MDOC's motion for summary judgment of
plaintiff's First Amendment claims.
The lower court should also have found that there was not
legitimate government interest which could have outweighed the
plaintiff's right under the First Amendment to charge the MDOC of
race discrimination.67 Generally, claims of discrimination should not
be found to disturb the efficient operation of the government. Some
cases have strongly held that, "There is simply no argument to be made
that an employee's complaints of sex and age discrimination undermine
"the effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise."6 Thus
the lower court would have had to consider the strong probability that
the the government's interest would have been outweighed by the
plaintiff's speech protected under the First Amendment had it properly
reached this analysis by finding that plaintiffs speech was a matter of
public concern.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Everett Perry, who so conscientiously ensured that
prisoner would receive fair hearings, merits the opportunity to present
his claims in a court of law. Mr. Perry has properly pled his allegations
against the MDOC. The court in this case did not review the facts
therein by the appropriate standard for summary judgment. The
" See Plaintiff's Proof Brief at 30, citing Chappel v. Montgomery County Fire
Protection Dist. No. 1, 131 F.3d 564, 575 (6th Cir. 1997).
67 The court did not reach this analysis due to its finding that plaintiff did not
have a protected First Amendment speech right.
68 See Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission, 995 F. Supp. 1001,
1009 (E.D. Mo 1998). In this case, plaintiff alleged she was dismissed by her public
employer for her complaints of age and sex discrimination. See id.
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District court for the Eastern District of Michigan erred once in 1996
when it dismissed Mr. Perry's First Amendment claims; it erred again
in 1998 when it dismissed his remaining Equal protection and state law
race discrimination claims.
The appeal of the 1998 denial of Mr. Perry's equal protection
and Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act race discrimination claims will soon
be heard by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. The outcome of
this case could be a significant indication of the willingness of the
courts to hear cases in which the independence of an administrative
hearing officer is threatened, not only by the employers of the hearing
officers themselves, but also by judges who are reluctant to give
appropriate weight to a plaintiff's pleadings before granting summary
judgment. A careful ALJ should recognize that fair judicial process
may be easier to distribute to others than to obtain for themselves.
